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DISCRIMINATION CASES
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Let us proceed to another topic which has some relationship in
certain respects to Equal Protection. To discuss this topic and the
relevant cases, we have Touro's Vice-Dean. who has over the
years become a recognized authority in the area of
discrimination. Of course, I am referring to Professor Eileen
Kaufman. 1 Not only has she become an authority at the law
school and indeed at these conferences, but she is the original
drafter of the sections of New York Pattern Jury Instructions, the
model jury instructions that New York judges use in the course of
trying discrimination cases. It is now my pleasure to introduce
Professor Eileen Kaufman.
Professor Eileen Kaufman:
Thank you. Leon always asks me to speak late in the day, but
the quid pro quo is that he gives me the best cases to talk about.
The Equal Protection2 cases that I will be describing represent
either the finest or the worst moments of the term, depending on
your point of view.
1. Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center. B.A., Skidmore College, 1970; J.D.. New York University,
1975: L.L.M., New York University, 1992. In addition to serving as Vice
Dean and Professor of Law at Touro Law Center, Dean Kaufman has been a
Managing Attorney at Westchester Legal Services, Inc. and serves on the New
York State Bar Association President's Committee on Access to Justice, and is
Reporter for the New York Pattern Jury Instructions. She has published
primarily in the area of civil rights law.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
461
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Last term, the Supreme Court decided three important
discrimination cases: one involving age discrimination in the
workplace, 3 one involving discrimination against gays and
lesbians in the political process4 and one involving sex
discrimination in higher education. 5 Not surprisingly, Justice
Scalia figured prominently in all three cases. 6 I will discuss
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,7 the statutory
age discrimination case, rather quickly so that we can focus on
the two highly controversial equal protection cases of the term,
Romer v. Evans8 and United States v. Virginia.9
The first of these important discrimination cases was O'Connor
v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. This case arose under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196710 [hereinafter
"ADEA"]. 11 The issue in O'Connor was whether a plaintiff, in
3. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307
(1996).
4. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
5. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). See also Eric J.
Stockel, United States v. Virginia: Does Intermediate Scrutiny Still Exist?, 13
TOURO L. REv. 229 (1996).
6. Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in O'Connor and wrote
particularly ascerbic dissents in Romer and Virginia, the two equal protection
cases.
7. 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
8. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
9. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1985). Section 623(a) states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in a way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
11. Petitioner was employed by respondent for twelve years before he was
fired. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1309. He claimed that he was discharged in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 that prohibits
the denial of employment opportunities on the basis of age. Id. Petitioner, age
462 [Vol 13
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an age discrimination suit, must demonstrate that he or she was
replaced by someone outside of the protected age category in
order to make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green12 framework. 13
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, a Title VII case, the Supreme
Court developed a formula that allocates the burdens and order of
presentation of proof in discrimination cases based on
circumstantial evidence. 14 Under this formula, a plaintiff must
establish the following four elements to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination: 1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected
group defined by the statute; 2) that plaintiff applied for and was
56 at the time of his discharge, could not prove that his replacement was a
member of a class not protected by the statute. Id. at 1310. The Court held that
the fact that Petitioner was replaced by someone within the protected class is
"irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.... because the
ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class membership."
Id.
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Respondent was employed by petitioner as a
mechanic for eight years before he was laid off. Id. at 794. Respondent
maintained that his discharge was a result of respondent's racially motivated
hiring practices and was, therefore, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). Title VII was enacted in response to the nationwide persistence of
discrimination against minority groups to eliminate the unfairness and
humiliation of discrimination. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer.
Kennedy, King, Shuttlesivorth and Walker: The Events Leading to the
Inroduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 671
(1995). In McDonnell Douglas, respondent was an active participant in a
variety of protests at petitioner's manufacturing plant. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 794-95. The Court found that, while petitioner was able to justify
its reasons for discharging the respondent, the respondent must be afforded an
opportunity to refute petitioner's reason for his discharge as a mere pretext. Id.
at 804. The case was remanded to the District Court because respondent was
not given a "full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence
that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up
for a racially discriminatory decision." Id. at 805.
13. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1309. While the McDonnell Douglas
framework has traditionally been applied to plaintiffs bringing Title VII
discrimination actions, it has also been applied to ADEA cases. Id. at 1310.
Therefore, in order to make out a claim under the ADEA, petitioner must
make a prima facie showing under this framework. Id.
14. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
1997]
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qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking
applicants; 3) that plaintiff did not receive the position; and 4)
that after the rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to interview applicants possessing plaintiff's
qualifications. 15  These four elements must be adapted for
discharge or promotion cases. Once the plaintiff makes this
initial four part showing, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employer's rejection."' 16  After the employer attempts to
explain its reasons for the discharge, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to establish that the employer's proffered reason was
merely a pretext for discrimination. 17
In O'Connor, plaintiff, age 56, claimed that he was discharged
because of his age in violation of the ADEA. 18 He had no
difficulty establishing the first three McDonnell Douglas
elements. 19 Clearly, he was a member of the age group
protected by the ADEA, he was discharged, and at the time of
his discharge he was performing his job at a level that met his
employer's expectations. 20 However, he was unable to meet the
burden of proving the fourth element because his replacement
was also within the protected age group proscribed by the
ADEA. 2 1 Thus, the issue became whether a prima facie claim of
discrimination requires that the replacement be outside the
protected class. 22 The Court concluded that it does not. 23
15. Id. at 802.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 804.
18. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.. 116 S. Ct. 1307,
1309 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id. The ADEA protects all persons who are at least 40 years of age.
See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1985 & Supp. 1996). Petitioner, at the time of his
discharge, was 56 years old, and well within the protected class enumerated in
the statute. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1309.
21. Id. Plaintiff's replacement was 40 years old. Id.
22. Id. at 1310.
23. Id. The Court noted that "the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced
by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case." Id.
[Vol 13464
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According to the Court, in order to determine whether an
inference of discrimination exists, the proper inquiry should be
whether the plaintiff was replaced by someone substantially
younger, not whether plaintiff was replaced by someone outside
the protected group. 24 The Court reasoned that "the fact that one
person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the
protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out
because of his age."25
An important question that arises from O'Connor is whether or
not this principle will be applied to other discrimination statutes,
particularly race or sex discrimination claims arising under Title
VI.26 The central rationale of O'Connor seems to be equally
applicable to cases involving race or gender discrimination
although there is already disagreement in the circuits about the
applicability of O'Connor to Title VII. For example, in Carson
v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,27 a case involving race
discrimination under Title VII, 28 the Seventh Circuit held that
O'Connor applies and that a Title VII plaintiff need not allege
that the replacement was outside the protected class.2 9 The Court
reasoned that:
24. Id. The Court illustrated this distinction by comparing a 40 year old
who is replaced by a 39 year old to a situation where a 56 year old is replaced
by a 40 year old worker. Id. In the former circumstance, the replacement is
outside the protected class but a one year age difference would hardly support
an inference of age discrimination. Id. Whereas, in the latter situation, a 16
year age difference may signify age discrimination even though both
individuals are within the protected class. Id.
25. Id.
26. Title VII is aimed at eliminating employment discrimination "against
any individual with respect to his compensation, term, conditions, or
privileges in employment, because of the individual's race, sex, color.
religion, and national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988 & Supp. V
1996)
27. 82 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. Plaintiff, a white female, brought suit against her former employee
claiming that her discharge was in violation of Title VII. Id. at 158.
29. Id. at 158. The court noted that the relevant inquiry was "whether the
employee would have taken the same action had the employee been of a
different race ... and everything else had remained the same." Id. (emphasis
added).
1997] 465
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[a]n employee may be able to show that his race or another
characteristic that the law places off limits tipped the scales
against him, without regard to the demographic characteristics of
his replacement. . . .That one's replacement is of another race,
sex or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but
it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. 30
However, the Sixth Circuit, in dicta, has indicated that the
O'Connor reasoning does not apply with equal force to sex
discrimination cases. 3 1 Ultimately, the Supreme Court is likely
to decide the scope and reach of the O'Connor holding.
The two Equal Protection discrimination cases decided last
term are among the most symbolically and practically significant
decisions of the Court in recent years. The first case, Romer v.
Evans,32 involved a challenge to Amendment 2 of the Colorado
State Constitution, which prohibited the State of Colorado and its
political subdivisions from enacting any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy designed to protect homosexual persons from
30. Id. at 158-59. The Seventh Circuit hypothesized an employer who
retains black workers only in the top quarter of its labor force on a yearly basis
but keeps white employees at the top half. This employer is engaging in racial
discrimination which is not purged if, thereafter, the employer has another
black employee. Id.
31. See Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that, even
though the plaintiff mat the four element test of McDonnell Douglas, the
defendant was able to prove that their decision not to promote plaintiff was not
based on sex, but rather that plaintiff lacked necessary computer skills), cert.
denied. 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997).
32. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Respondents challenged the constitutionality
of the State of Colorado's Amendment 2 on the grounds that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1623. The
effect of Amendment 2 was to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting
any statute, ordinance, rule or policy that barred discrimination based sexual
preferences. Id. at 1624. Respondents alleged that Amendment 2 would
"subject them to immediate and substantial risk of discrimination on the basis
of their sexual orientation." Id. Petitioners maintained that Amendment 2
only denies homosexuals preferential treatment. Id. The majority of the Court
ruled that Amendment 2 puts homosexuals in a "solitary class ... [and]
withdraws from [them], but no others, specific legal protection from the
injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws
and policies." Id. at 1625.
[Vol 13466
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discrimination. 33 The Amendment withdrew from gays and
lesbians "specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
[private and governmental] discrimination. "34  Further,
Amendment 2 forbade such anti-discrimination laws, which had
already been enacted in Denver, Aspen and Boulder, to be
reinstated. 35  Thus, while the proponents of Amendment 2
linguistically described the amendment as denying special rights,
Amendment 2 did just the opposite; it imposed a special disability
on this group alone because no other group must amend the State
constitution in order to obtain protection against discrimination. 36
In a 6-3 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
subjected the legislation to rational basis review, 37 the lowest
level of judicial scrutiny afforded to equal protection claims. 38
Under the rational basis test, a classification is upheld so long as
it bears a rational relation to a legitimate end. 39 Thus, even a
law that "seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a
particular group" or is supported by only a tenuous rationale,
will, nevertheless, survive constitutional challenge. 40
However, Colorado's Amendment 2 could not pass even this
most deferential level of scrutiny. 4 1 The Court could not find a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the classification and
noted that this type of broad "disqualification of a class of
persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
33. Id. at 1623.
34. Id. at 1625.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1626-27.
37. Id. at 1627.
38. See e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct 2637 (1993) (holding that a state
statute that draws classifications involving the mentally retarded and mentally
ill are upheld if there is a rational basis between the classification drawn and a
legitimate governmental purpose).
39. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
40. Id. The Court stated that "[b]y requiring that a classification bear a
rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we
ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law." Id.
41. Id. at 1628.
1997] 467
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unprecedented in our jurisprudence." 42  The disadvantage
imposed on the group was not a by-product of the classification,
it was itself the purpose of the classification. 4 3  The Court
concluded that "the inevitable inference raised by Amendment 2
is that the disadvantage imposed was born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected."' 44  Justice Kennedy strongly
reminded us that, "[i]f the constitutional concept of 'equal
protection' of the laws means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 4 5
The majority opinion is as interesting for what it does not say
as for what it does say. First, the Court makes no mention of the
political process cases, such as Hunter v. Erickson,4 6 even though
that was the basis for the Colorado Supreme Court decision. 47
The Colorado Supreme Court had held that Amendment 2
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. "Amendment 2... make[s] a general announcement that gays and
lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them
immediate, continuing and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate
justifications that may be claimed for it." Id. at 1628-29.
45. Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)(emphasis omitted)).
46. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). After the City Council of Akron, Ohio adopted
a fair housing ordinance, voters amended the city charter to prohibit any
ordinance regulating "the use, sale advertisement, transfer ... of real
property ... on the basis of race, color, religion or ancestry." Id. at 387. The
Court held that a State may not "disadvantage any particular group by making
it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size." Id. at 393. Since this was exactly what the City of Akron
intended to do. the ordinance violated the equal protection clause and
constituted "a real, substantial, and invidious denial of equal protection of the
laws." Id.
47. Romer, 116 S. Ct 1624. The Colorado Supreme Court found that
"Amendment 2 was to be subject to strict scrutiny because it infringed the
fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process."
Id. The Colorado court relied on previous United States Supreme Court
decisions in both voting rights cases and cases involving discriminatory
restructuring of governmental decision making. Id. See Evans v. Romer, 882
P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
468 [Vol 13
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violated the fundamental right of equal participation in the
political process. 48  Second, the majority opinion neither
mentions nor cites Bowers v. Hardwick,49 the 1986 decision
upholding Georgia's consensual sodomy statute. More about that
in a moment. Third, the Court failed to decide whether
heightened scrutiny should be applied in Equal Protection
challenges based on sexual orientation. Instead, the Court's
opinion reflects the approaches advocated in two amicus briefs,
one submitted by five constitutional law professors including
Lawrence H. Tribe of Harvard Lav School50 and the other by
the Human Rights Campaign Fund.5 1 The brief filed by the
48. Romer, 116 S. Ct 1624.
49. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Respondent was charged with committing
sodomy with another adult male in the privacy of his home in violation of a
Georgia statute forbidding sodomy by any person. Id. at 187-88. Hardwick
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia statute. Id. at 188.
Hardwick challenged the statute on the basis of substantive due process and the
Court framed the issue as whether he had a fundamental right to engage m
homosexual sodomy. Id. at 191. The Court held that fundamental liberties are
either "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 194. As such, the Court concluded that
homosexual sodomy was not such a liberty under the aforementioned criteria
and therefore, the Court upheld the statute against Respondent's substantive
due process attack. Id. at 196.
50. See Amicus Brief of Lawrence H. Tribe, John Hartley. Gerald
Gunther. Phillip B. Kurland and Kathleen M. Sullivan in Support of
Respondents, 1995 WL 862021 (No. 94-1039).
5 1. See Amicus Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund. et al.. in
Support of Respondents, 1995 WL 782809 (No. 94-1039). Amici consisted of
a variety of organizations including:
several national organizations dedicated to the protection of civil rights.
including the Human Rights Campaign Fund, the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association,
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the Gay and Lesbian Medical
Association, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, the National
Organization for Women and the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund.
Amici also include state organizations concerned about discrimination,
including the Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund, Inc..
the Gay and Lesbian Law Association of Florida, the Oregon Gay and
Lesbian Law Association, Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom,
19971 469
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constitutional law professors argued that Amendment 2 was the
rare example of a literal deprivation of equal protection because
only gays and lesbians were ineligible for state law protection
against discrimination. 52 The brief submitted by the Human
Rights Campaign Fund argued that given the state's justifications
for Amendment 2, which included the protection of the freedom
of association of landlords and employers and the need to
conserve law enforcement resources, the amendment could not
withstand rational basis review because the amendment was so
tremendously over and under inclusive with respect to those
objectives. The majority opinion incorporates both theories
enumerated in the amicus briefs and, despite its failure to tackle
some of the obvious questions prompted by this Amendment, it
does establish the principle that governmental discrimination
against gays and lesbians will not be upheld when supported only
by an animus directed against this particular group. 53
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, wrote a particularly scathing dissenting opinion. 54 In
the very first sentence, Justice Scalia writes "[t]he Court has
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite." 55 Kulturkampf refers
to the conflict between the German imperial government and the
Roman Catholic Church in the late 19th century, chiefly over the
control of educational and ecclesiastical appointments. 5 6 In other
words, a kulturkampf is a culture struggle and Justice Scalia
makes clear which side of this culture war he supports.
According to Justice Scalia, Amendment 2 is the result of a
cultural debate over whether opposition to homosexuality is as
Lawyers for Human Rights - the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of
Los Angeles, Orange County Lawyers for Equality Gay and Lesbian,
and the Tom Homann Bar Association of San Diego.
Id. at *1.
52. Amicus Brief of Lawrence H. Tribe, et al., 1995 WL 862021, *3 (No.
94-1039).
53. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct 1620, 1627 (1996).
54. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
56. Kulturkampf is defined as a "conflict between civil government and
religious authorities esp[ecially] over control of education and church
appointments." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 667 (1989).
[Vol 13
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reprehensible as racial or religious bias. 57 To Justice Scalia,
there is nothing objectionable about a "modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradoans to preserve traditional sexual
mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to
revise those mores through use of the laws." 58
Moreover, Justice Scalia found the majority's reasoning to be
inconsistent with Bowers. He maintained that if Bowers
permitted a State to make homosexual conduct illegal, then it
must surely be "constitutionally permissible for a State to enact
other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct." 59
Anticipating the argument that Amendment 2 reaches status and
not conduct, Justice Scalia asserted that it is surely "rational to
deny special favor, and protection to those with a self-avowed
tendency or desire to engage in the conduct." 60 One of the
mistakes that Justice Scalia makes in his analysis is that
homosexual sodomy is not synonymous with homosexual
conduct.
The intriguing question that arises after Romer is to what
extent, if at all, Romer undercuts the continued vitality of
Bowers. As an aside, we should note that after Justice Powell
retired, he admitted that he probably made a mistake in joining
the 5-4 majority in Bowers. 61 On the surface, one can easily
reconcile the two cases by pointing out that Romer is an Equal
Protection case whereas Bowers was a substantive due process
case. Second, the Court is unquestionably averse to expanding
substantive due process. Third, it is not necessarily inconsistent
to permit a state to prohibit a particular activity while not
permitting the state to immunize open-ended discrimination
against an entire class of persons, some of whom might engage in
57. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
58. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
59. Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
60. Id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIs F. POWELL. JR.: A
BIOGRAPHY 530 (1994) ("On October 18, 1994, Powell gave the annual James
Madison lecture at New York University Law School and afterward answered
students' questions... . 'I think I probably made a mistake on that one,*
Powell said of Bowers.").
1997]
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that activity. 62 At the very least, Romer symbolically marks the
beginning of a new era in which the Court, for the very first
time, has recognized and sustained an equal protection claim
advanced by gays and lesbians. 63
The other equally controversial Equal Protection case of the
term was United States v. Virginia,64 where the Court found that
Virginia's policy of excluding women from the Virginia Military
Institute [hereinafter "VMI"] violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 65 VMI, as we all know, is an unusual and indeed a
unique institution. Its self-described mission is to produce
"citizen-soldiers" defined as men prepared for leadership in
either military service or civilian life. 66 VMI has been quite
successful in fulfilling this mission as its graduates include
military generals, Congressmen, and captains of industry. 67 The
manner in which VMI prepares its students to be citizen-soldiers
is through a model of education featuring "physical rigor, mental
stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute
regulation of behavior and indoctrination in desirable values." 6 8
62. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1622. Kathleen Sullivan, counsel for Amici
Curiae, argued that even if a State made gambling illegal, it would not follow
that the same State may authorize unlimited discrimination against gamblers as
a class. Amicus Brief of Lawrence H. Tribe. et al., 1995 WL 862021, *10
(No. 94-1039). Furthermore, when the State permits inequality under the law,
it "renders a person ineligible for the protection from an entire category of
wrongful conduct that might otherwise be available through the state's system
for making and enforcing laws." Id.
63. Romer, 116 S. Ct 1629.
64. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
65. Id. at 2287 ("The State [of Virginia] has shown no 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for withholding from women qualified for the
experience premier training of the kind VMI affords.").
66. Id. at 2269. VMI's mission statement aims "to produce educated and
honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued with love of
learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a
high sense of public service ... and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their
country in time of national peril." Id. at 2270 (quoting Mission Study
Committee of the VMI Board of Visitors, Report, May 16, 1986).
67. Id. VMI's reputation as an exceptionally challenging military
undergraduate school and its wide base of alumni contacts attracts men
dedicated to becoming citizen-soldiers. Id. at 2270-71.
68. Id. at 2270.
[Vol 13472
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All sides in the dispute agreed that this model of education was
unique to VMI and unavailable to women.69
Despite that fact, the district court ruled in favor of VMI,
finding that single sex education yields substantial benefits, which
would be lost if women were permitted to enroll. 70 Moreover,
the district court found that single-sex education brings diversity
to an otherwise coeducational school system.71  The Fourth
Circuit reversed, finding that Virginia had failed to rationalize its
determination to achieve diversity by offering VMI's unique type
of program to men but not to women. 72 The court concluded
that "a policy of diversity which aims to provide an array of
educational opportunities, including single-gender institutions,
must do more than favor one gender." 73
The Fourth Circuit offered the following three remedial options
to VMI: (1) admit women to VMI; (2) establish a parallel
program; or (3) give up financial support from the State. 74
Virginia responded by proposing a plan to establish an all-female,
publicly-funded military college that would provide a single-sex
education similar to that of VMI.75 The Virginia Woman's
Institute for Leadership [hereinafter "VWIL"] would be located
at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts college, and
would be supported with funding equal to the support provided
for VMI cadets. Both the District Court and a divided Fourth
Circuit approved this remedial plan by using a "substantive
69. "VMI pursues this mission through pervasive training of a kind not
available anywhere else in Virginia." Id. at 2269.
70. 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (W.D.Va. 1991).
71. Id. at 1413.
72. 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992).
73. Id. at 899. The court went further and stated that "if responsibility for
implementing diversity has somehow been delegated to an individual
institution, no explanation is apparent as to how one institution with
autonomy, but with no authority over any other state institution, can give
effect to a state policy of diversity among institutions." Id.
74. Id. at 900.
75. The plan called for the establishment of the Virginia Woman's Institute
for Leadership. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2282-83 (1996).
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comparability" test, roughly equivalent to a "separate but equal"
approach. 7 6
Two issues were presented for Supreme Court review: first, did
Virginia's exclusion of women from VMI constitute unlawful
gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause; and
second, presuming that the exclusion violated the Equal
Protection Clause, what is the appropriate remedy for that
constitutional violation. 77
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg must have derived
tremendous satisfaction. 78 After all, she led the fight in the
1970's to establish the Equal Protection Clause as a weapon to
combat sex discrimination. 79 It was not until 1971, in Reed v.
Reed,80 that the Equal Protection Clause was used to strike down
76. See generally, United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D.Va.
1994); United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth
Circuit determined that, in order for Virginia to satisfy the "substantive
comparability" test, the court had to determine:
(1) whether the state's objective of providing single-gender education to
its citizens may be considered a legitimate and important governmental
objective; (2) whether the gender classification adopted is directly and
substantially related to that purpose; and (3) whether the resulting
mutual exclusion of women and men from each other's institutions
leaves open opportunities for those excluded to obtain substantively
comparable benefits at their institution or through other means offered
by the state."
Id. at 1237.
77. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).
78. The majority opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg and was joined
by Justices Stevens, O'Connor. Kennedy, Souter and Breyer. Chief Justice
Rehnquist concurred separately and Justice Scalia dissented. Justice Thomas
did not participate because his son attends VMI.
79. See Deborah L. Marcowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's
Work To Change The Law, 14 WOMAN'S RTs. L. REP. 335 (1992). Justice
Ginsburg became active with women's rights in the 1960's while she was a
professor at Rutgers University School of Law. Id at 337. Shortly after acting
as a volunteer attorney for the New Jersey affiliate of the ACLU, she joined
Melvin L. Wulf, Legal Director of the ACLU, in drafting the ACLU's amicus
brief in Reed v. Reed. Id. See 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
80. Id.
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a state statute that discriminated against women. 8 1  Justice
Ginsburg painstakingly detailed the history of romantic
paternalism that was the hallmark of the judicial response to
claims of gender discrimination in an effort to remind the reader
why the Court applies heightened scrutiny when reviewing
gender classifications. 82 Interestingly, despite the fact that mid-
level scrutiny has come to be recognized as the appropriate test to
evaluate gender claims, Drew S. Days, Jr., on behalf of the
Clinton administration, argued that the Court should adopt strict
scrutiny in this case. 83
While not adopting strict scrutiny, the Court did apply a
particularly rigorous mid-level or intermediate scrutiny test. 84
Mid-level scrutiny generally requires that the classification be
based upon an important governmental objective and that the
means employed by the state be substantially related to achieving
that objective. 85 Since the adoption of mid-level scrutiny in
1976,86 we have seen at least a few variations on how that test is
employed. For example, in the hands of Justice Rehnquist, mid-
level scrutiny is hard to distinguish from rational basis review,
most notably in Matter of Michael M. v. Superior Court,87 the
statutory rape case.
81. Id. at 73. In Reed, the Court held that a mandatory provision of an
Idaho statute, which gave preference to men over women for appointments as
administrators of estates, was an unconstitutional gender classification. Id at
77. The Court rejected the State's argument that administrative convenience
sufficed to justify the disparate treatment under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 76.
82. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75. Heightened scrutiny places a burden
on the State to show that the classification serves "important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 2275.
83. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 18, United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig. a majority of the
Court adopted an intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny for discrimination
based upon gender. Id. at 197.
87. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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However, in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg
refereed to mid-level scrutiny as "skeptical scrutiny," 88 requiring
a searching review, whereby the Court determines whether the
government has satisfied the demanding burden of establishing an
exceedingly persuasive justification. 89 This exceedingly
persuasive justification must be "genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation. . . and it must not
rely on over-broad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females." 90
Applying this standard to VMI's exclusion of women, Justice
Ginsburg rejected Virginia's claim that the exclusion of women
furthered the state's interest in achieving diversity in education. 9 1
Because mid-level scrutiny requires that the classification be
evaluated in reference to its actual objectives, and not after the
fact justifications, the majority concluded that the history of
excluding women from VMI was unrelated to achieving
educational diversity. 92 In other words, the Court decided that
achieving diversity among institutions was not the actual reason
for the challenged admissions policy. 93
The majority had little trouble rejecting Virginia's claims that:
(1) the program at VMI could not be adapted for women; (2) that
the admission of women would downgrade VMI's stature; and
(3) that women would not be interested in enrolling at VMI. 94
While conceding that most women would not choose to attend
VMI, the majority also noted that most men would choose not to
enroll. 95 However, that was not the issue in this case. The issue
was "whether the State can constitutionally deny to women who
88. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
89. Id. at 2275.
90. Id. at 2274-75.
91. Id. at 2279.
92. Id. at 2277. The Court cautioned that "benign justifications proffered
in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically: a
tenable justification must describe actual State purposes, not rationalizations
for actions in fact differently grounded." Id.
93. Id. at 2279.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2280.
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have the will and capacity, the training and attendant
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords." 9 6
In response to the concern that the admission of women would
tarnish the reputation of VMI. if not completely destroy the
institution, Justice Ginsburg documented the fact that, over the
ages, this fear has been used to deny rights and opportunities to
women. 97 She cited a 1925 report from Columbia Law School
which stated:
the faculty ... never maintained that women could not master
legal learning ... No, its argument has been ... more
practical. If women were admitted to the Columbia Law School,
[the faculty] said, then the choicer, more manly and red-blooded
graduates of our great universities would go to the Harvard Law
School!98
The majority concluded that VMI's goal of producing citizen
soldiers would not be compromised by the admission of women
"who today count as citizens in our American democracy equal in
stature to men." 99
Having found that the admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court had to determine an appropriate
remedy. The Court noted that a proper remedy must "eliminate
to the extent possible the discriminatory effects of the past and
bar like discrimination in the future. "100
The Court found Virginia's remedial plan, which consisted of
establishing VWIL at Mary Baldwin College, to be woefully
inadequate.101 The Court found that, although described as a
parallel program, VWIL did not provide a rigorous military
training, the very hallmark of VMI. 102 Instead. VWIL de-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2281 ("The notion that admission of women would downgrade
VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is
a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other 'self-
fulfilling prophecies.'").
98. Id. (quoting The Nation, Feb. 18, 1925, at 173).
99. Id. at 2282.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2284.
102. Id. at 2283.
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emphasized military training in favor of a cooperative method of
education designed to reinforce self-esteem. 103
Furthermore, VWIL students do not wear uniforms, they do
not live together throughout the four year program and they do
not eat meals together. 104 In short, none of the VMI barracks
style living, "designed to foster an egalitarian ethic" and deemed
so essential to that experience, exist at VWIL. 105 Thus, in many
ways, the VWIL program proved dramatically inferior: the
students were less qualified; the faculty was less impressive and
not paid as well; the course offerings were far more limited; and
the facilities were far less extensive. 106
While acknowledging the pragmatic differences between the
programs, Virginia maintained that they were justified
pedagogically based on the important differences between how
men and women learn. 10 7 However, the Court stated that this is
just the type of stereotypical thinking and over-broad
generalization that proves fatal when evaluating gender
discrimination claims. 10 8 According to the Court, Virginia could
not demonstrate the substantial equality between the two
programs, and as such, the remedy failed to match the severity of
the constitutional violation and was deemed inadequate. 109
Justice Scalia wrote another scathing dissent, criticizing the
majority for applying what, to him, seems to be a beefed up mid-
level scrutiny test. 110 He also condemned the Court for implying
that it has not ruled out the use of strict scrutiny to resolve gender
cases. I Justice Scalia accused the majority of playing Supreme
Court "peek-a-boo" and of irresponsibly using language
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2287.
107. Id. at 2283.
108. Id. at 2284.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Intermediate scrutiny has never
acquired a least-restrictive-means analysis, but only a 'substantial relation'
between the classification and the State interests that it serves.").
111. Id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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calculated to destabilize the law. 112  Even Chief Justice
Rehnquist fails to escape Justice Scalia's pen. Although finding
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion more moderate than the
majority's, Justice Scalia believes that was at the expense of
being even more implausible. 113
What is the status of government supported single-sex
institutions, given the VMI decision? In Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan,114 the 1982 nursing school case, the Court
declined to decide the question of whether states can provide
separate but equal undergraduate institutions for males and
females. 115 In United States v. Virginia, the Court pointedly
stated that it was addressing only the constitutionality of an
educational opportunity recognized as being unique and available
only at the State's sole single-sex university. 116 However, in a
footnote, the majority acknowledged they "do not question the
112. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that both the
State and Federal Government are entitled to know what standard of judicial
scrutiny they will be held to before they act. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia found that Chief
Justice Rehnquist's approach was even more implausible than the majority's
approach because of his dismissal of Virginia's justifications for a single-sex
admission policy. Id. at 2304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To Justice Scalia, one
question was left unanswered under Justice Rehnquist's rationale: "[f
Virginia cannot get credit for assisting women's education if it only treats
women's private schools ... then why should it get [the] blame for assisting
men's education if it only treats VMI as it does all other public schools? This
is a great puzzlement." Id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan. the
State of Mississippi sought to uphold the female-only admissions policy at the
Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing on the grounds that the
admissions policy was designed to compensate for past discrimination against
women, and therefore, constituted educational affirmative action. Id. at 727.
The lawsuit was brought by Joe Hogan, a male who had sought admission to
the baccalaureate program at the nursing school. Id. at 720. He was denied
admission solely on the basis of his sex, even though his qualifications equaled
those of the admitted women. Id. at 720-21. The Hogan Court, applying
intermediate scrutiny, struck down the statute, finding the exclusion did not
serve the compensatory purpose proffered by the State. Id. at 730.
115. Id. at 721 n.1.
116. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7.
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State's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational
opportunities. " 117
In my opinion, this statement means that the court would
uphold single-sex schools so long as they were justified
pedagogically, and so long as substantial equality between the
schools was established. However, what is less clear is whether
substantial equality will, in every case, require programmatic
equivalence.
As a final note, I should add that we may be entering a new era
of Equal Protection analysis, whereby the choice of what
standard of review governs may be less outcome-determinative
than in the past. Two terms ago, in Adarand Construction v.
Pena, 118 an affirmative action case, the Court explicitly rejected
the maxim that "strict scrutiny was strict in theory but fatal in
fact." 119 Moreover, the Court's use of rational basis in Romer v.
Evans may signify a toothier test than the "any conceivable
basis" version lately in vogue.
While the outcome of cases using mid-level scrutiny has always
been difficult to predict, it may be that, if the Court continues to
use the version of mid-level scrutiny employed by the majority in
VMI. the test may more closely resemble strict scrutiny than it
has in the past. 120
Perhaps the Court is unwittingly and unself-consciously edging
toward what Justice Marshall unsuccessfully advocated more than
twenty years ago, a sliding scale of judicial review dependent on
117. Id.
118. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
119. Id. at 2275 n.6.
120. It must be noted that the Supreme Court has, on two occasions,
seemingly left open the possibility that strict scrutiny may be adopted for
review of gender classifications in the future. See Stockel, supra note 5, at
237, n.55 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
n.9 (1982) ("Because we conclude that the challenged statutory classification is
not substantially related to an important objective, we need not decide whether
classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect."); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 n.6 (1994) ("Because we conclude that
gender-based peremptory challenges are not substantially related to an
important government objective, we once again need not decide whether
classifications based on gender are inherently suspect.")).
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the strength of the interest asserted and the invidiousness of the
classification itself. 12 1 The Court's recent Equal Protection cases
may not signal a major sea of change in Equal Protection analysis
but they do signify some shifting of the sands.
121. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 97-110
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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